MENA countries tend to underperform on access to SME lending compared to financial sector depth and relative to countries with similar GDP levels, as illustrated in figures 1 and 2. MENA financial systems are bank-dominated (bank assets were 63.6 percent of GDP in 2008), and banks lend to a narrow set of clients, including the government and larger corporates. MENA countries also tend to have relatively low access to deposits compared to GDP per head. 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 Deposits accounts per 1,000 Adults
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Industry Structure
Financial inclusion in the MENA region is characterized by NGO-dominated microcredit sectors, postal networks and state banks. A few countries have introduced legislation that allows for other legal forms of microfinance provider, such as finance companies or banks, but as yet there are few microfinance institutions that are legally allowed to offer (voluntary) deposit services in MENA. Savings and loan cooperatives are not a major source of financial services in much of the MENA region. Table A1 .3 (Annex 1) sets out a typology of microfinance providers presented in table form. 'Industry' is defined here as the set of providers of financial services to low income and microenterprise clients.
Banks and Financial Inclusion
Direct commercial bank involvement in microfinance in the MENA region is very limited. Banks prefer to provide wholesale financing through specialized microcredit providers. Bankmicrocredit provider linkages build on the relative strengths of both types of entity -banks are able to raise funds from deposits and from the market and often have excess funds looking for returns, while MFIs are closer to clients, have tailored lending methodologies and delivery mechanisms, and lack funds. One of the big three Lebanese MFIs, Ameen, provides financial services in partnership with four Lebanese banks. Moroccan banks have set-up microcredit associations or foundations, rather than provide microloans directly. In Egypt two private sector banks offer microcredit in cooperation with microfinance service companies.
State banks are significant providers of financial services for low income people and microenterprises in some MENA countries. In Algeria, for example, the top 3 providers of loans to micro and small enterprises are public banks, with private banks and NGOs (associations) far behind, although the market share for private banks was growing (IFC survey, 2006) . While in Syria, half of MSEs interviewed for the IFC (2008) used banking services from the large public bank, Commercial Bank of Syria. For loans to MSEs, public banks were also the leading providers -Real Estate Bank, Popular Credit Bank, and Commercial Bank of Syria.
State banks hold a significant proportion of financial service outlets in several MENA countries, including Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Iraq. The Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PDBAC) is the state agricultural bank in Egypt, and has more than 1200 branches and 23,000 employees throughout the country outside of Cairo, providing deposit services; payments services; foreign currency services and passbooks, machinery and equipment loans and lending for agriculture and other food production enterprises. In Iraq over two thirds (69 percent) of the bank branch network is owned by the two large state banks, Rafidain and Rasheed.
Microfinance banks, or specialized microfinance institutions, are an alternative model where regulations allow. Instead of relying on banks for deposits and commercial borrowing, microfinance banks can intermediate their own funds. AGFUND and the Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance are committed to establishing microfinance 'banks' as specialized financial institutions that provide a broad range of financial services to low income people and microenterprises, on a sustainable basis. AGFUND has set-up MFIs in Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. For example, Al Amal microfinance bank was established under the Yemen microfinance law, and offers deposit and lending services to low income clients, including micro and small enterprises. Al Amal started operations in 2008, and now has nine branches, 12,000 active clients (half of whom are savers). A money exchange company in Yemen has also reportedly converted to a microfinance bank, Al Kurami. The Aga Khan Foundation has set-up a deposit-taking microfinance institution in Syria, which has some characteristics of a microfinance bank microfinance bank, as a Social Financial Banking Institution. Under Syria's General Microfinance Decree such an institution is allowed to provide microlending, deposittaking, and micro insurance.
Microcredit in MENA
Microcredit
3 is still limited in scale in much of the region. The market coverage ratio for specialized microfinance providers is only half (1.78 percent) the proportion of the adult population as is the case for South Asia or Latin America. 4 As indicated in Table 2 , the number of active borrowers compared to working age adults is much smaller than all regions except subSaharan Africa, while microcredit loan portfolios represent a significantly smaller proportion of total credit 5 In terms of clients per population and microcredit portfolio as a proportion of total bank lending to the private sector, Morocco still has the highest rates of microcredit access in the region, although this should be viewed in the context of Morocco's low level of access to bank loans. Morocco also stands out in terms of MFI branch networks, comprising 83 percent of the region's reported total. (MIX, CGAP, Sanabel, 2010) Microcredit is concentrated in a relatively small number of leading institutions. The top 5 MFIs in MENA represent 43 percent of total outreach, and 3 of these are from Morocco (Annex A2.4 has a country breakdown by borrowers and by loan portfolio). 70 percent of microfinance institution (MFI) branches are in Morocco. Microcredit is not well developed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, where only Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have microfinance institutions that report to the regional microfinance network (Sanabel) . Reported portfolio quality in MENA is generally good, with the exception of Morocco and West Bank/Gaza. Portfolio at risk (measured at 30 days, a relatively conservative measure typical of microfinance) has been broadly stable in recent years, and averaged 3.9 percent for MENA in 2009. (Sanabel 2010) This is despite the decline in the quality of the Moroccan microcredit portfolio. MFIs in MENA are relatively 'profitable', with a higher average return on assets than MFIs in other regions. 8 This is driven by low expenses, high efficiency levels, and initial (zero cost) donor funding. Financial revenues are also low, and this relative profitability does not seem to be a factor of high interest rates (which do not tend to be high by global standards). Annex A2.3 presents efficiency, profitability, and portfolio quality data by country.
Postal Networks
Postal savings banks and post offices continue to be the primary providers of savings and payment services for low income people in the region. 
Financial Inclusion and the Global Financial Crisis
Loans to GDP declined in MENA in 2009 as a result of the crisis (with Tunisia a notable exception) for both loans and deposits, due to falls in commercial bank lending. Deposit volumes also fell, with some exceptions, while the number of deposit accounts continued to rise. This phenomenon of continued growth in access to deposits despite falls in overall deposits, was also a feature in other regions, except for those affected most severely by the global financial crisis (such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia), where both fell. (CGAP and World Bank Financial Access, 2010) Microfinance in MENA was not directly affected by the global financial crisis though. Microfinance markets have not generally reached an equilibrium between demand and supply, as reflected in high unmet levels of demand for microfinance, and the apparent lack of sensitivity to high interest rates (although rates in the MENA region are typically lower than other regions). In most markets microfinance volumes are primarily a function of funding available to microfinance institutions, and of the capacity of MFIs to expand sustainably and manage risks. Funding levels for MFIs were maintained throughout the crisis, with the exception of falls in donor funding to microfinance in Egypt and Morocco that were due to non-crisis factors, so the microfinance sector in MENA was fairly well insulated from the global financial crisis. Microcredit NGOs also did not have investment portfolios or direct exposure to complex financial instruments, depending primarily on donor funding and straightforward bank loans.
Financial Products for low income customers and microenterprises
Access to finance in MENA tends to be narrow, with most microfinance providers not able to offer transaction accounts, payments, housing loans, sight deposits, term deposits, or insurance products. Financial inclusion will continue to be constrained until regulatory reforms and financial infrastructure improvements allow banks and regulated microfinance providers to expand outreach to low income customers and microenterprises at a lower cost and risk.
The vast majority (94 percent) of microloans made by MENA MFIs are intended for microenterprise activities (Sanabel 2010) , although given that money is fungible this is a questionable distinction. The majority of microloans are also made through solidarity groups Lebanon and Yemen (CGAP, 2008 ). Yet IFC-commissioned market studies in the MENA region suggest a strong demand for Islamic microfinance products. Between 20 and 60 percent of those interviewed (microenterprises, low income individuals) indicated a preference for Shariahcompliant products. For some the lack of Shariah-compliant products is an absolute constraint to financial access, while for others this is a preference and they continue to use conventional financial services in the absence of competitive Islamic ones.
The range of Islamic finance products offered is narrow -over 70 percent of the Islamic finance products offered are murabaha (cost plus), which is a lending product typically used for working capital. Most MFIs in Yemen offer a murabaha loan product, for example. However, there are some signs that this limited selection may increase: in Egypt, Bank Misr plans to introduce Islamic microfinance activities to its 33 Islamic branches, and also develop a mudaraba (profit sharing agreement) product in addition to the murabaha product; in Yemen Tadhamon Islamic Bank opened a MSE division in late 2006; and in the UAE Noor Islamic Bank and Emirates Post Holding Group announced plans to establish a company to offer Shariacompliant financial services to low income clients.
Constraints to Islamic microfinance are mostly related to i) the capacity of microfinance providers to design authorized Islamic finance products that meet the needs of clients, and ii) the need to keep costs low for micro-level transactions. Islamic microfinance providers globally are still in the process of identifying innovations and adaptations to Islamic finance that lower costs and enable them to offer sufficiently attractive pricing to clients. Islamic microfinance can be more reliant on collateral to secure loans, rather than on cash flow-based financing techniques, and as such is more affected by weak collateral registration and enforcement regimes. There can also be a stronger tendency in Islamic jurisprudence to give borrowers more time and opportunity to repay, rather than executing collateral.
Delivery mechanisms for financial services
Bank branch networks are correlated with access to loans and deposit accounts.
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the number of deposit and loan accounts relative to the population in MENA is closely linked to the size of branch networks. 11 The number of deposit accounts per population does not seem positively related to the proportion of the branch network held by state banks ( Figure 7 ) though, despite a widespread assumption that state banks have deeper penetration in areas not covered by private banks and therefore can contribute to overall gains in access.
Figures 4 and 5. Deposits and Loans per Population against Branch Networks
11 As shown in Annex 1.4, the relationship between number of deposits and branches holds even after controlling for per capita income, although it should be noted that the regression results are only suggestive, given the very small sample, and the endogeneity of the branch variables. While branches facilitate a range of financial services, and can enable a personalized service to clients, 'branchless' outlets such as ATMs and point-of-sale devices also be effective delivery mechanisms not only for withdrawals but also for payments and deposits, at a considerably lower cost than branches. While MENA is typically at or below the averages for ATM access for other developing regions, access through point-of sale (POS) devices is relatively more widespread in MENA. Population densities, income levels, telecommunications networks, banking sector development, and Government policy all influence the density of touch points in the region, as elsewhere. ATM networks in the GCC countries are relatively dense and well developed (tables A3.1 and A3.2 have more ATM and POS detail). 
Mobile Banking
Mobile banking has the potential to be transformational because it: i) uses existing mobile communications infrastructure which already reaches unbanked people, ii) may be driven by new players, such as telecommunications companies, with different target markets from traditional banks, iii) may harness the power of new distribution networks for cash transactions, such as airtime merchants, beyond the conventional merchant POS or ATM networks of banks, and iv) may be cheaper than conventional banking, if the offering is competitive. (Porteous, 2006) CGAP research comparing service provides between banks and branchless banking service providers indicates that mobile banking services can be up to 50 percent cheaper (see Annex 3.4 for cost comparisons).
Mobile banking
12 has been used primarily for payments and transactions so far, and not for loans or savings, although pilots are underway to develop credit and deposit products through mobile phones. Using a mobile phone for more complex transactions than payments and transfers requires a different pricing structure (customers are unlikely to want to pay transferlevel fees to make a loan repayment), and also implies that regulators need to understand any risks that are involved, and to adapt supervisory practices and legal frameworks as appropriate.
The functionality of using a small keyboard and screen can also be seen as less convenient than using a branch or computer, even if mobile phones are much more easily accessible.
High potential countries for mobile phone banking in MENA include Egypt, Yemen and Morocco. The table below suggests a characterization of countries in terms of potential to benefit from mobile phone banking, and to support viable mobile phone financial products. Market potential is influenced by the number of unbanked potential customers, wireless penetration rates, and relatively conducive regulatory frameworks that allow private sector activity and innovation. Egypt has the largest population in the Arab world, with very low financial access, but 65 percent of the population (55.4 million) already has a mobile phone. (Michaels, 2010) Mobile and agent-based financial services could also transform access to finance in Yemen. Nearly 70 percent of the population is living in rural areas which are without basic infrastructure.
There are close to 8 million mobile phone subscribers in Yemen and less than 1 million bank accounts (CGAP, 2010) . While West Bank and Gaza does not have a large population, the difficulties of moving cash in and out of Gaza may provide a business case for the introduction of mobile phone banking. In Iraq, mobile phone banking may help commercial banks overcome constraints of limited branch networks (state banks control the majority of branches) and uncertain security of movement. CAC is one of the largest state-owned banks in Yemen, and already has a large portion of the bill payments business. It also has its own POS acquiring network, the largest in the country. The Mobile Money product is a mobile wallet, with customer funds kept in a pooled account at CAC. The service will be accessed at CAC's 85 branches, 92 ATMs and 1,000 POS systems.
M-dinar was launched in February 2010 by Banque International Arabe de Tunisie (BIAT), along with MNO Tunisiana and microfinance institution ENDA, and is a mobile wallet application. Users need to open a BIAT account, and the service will allow for person to person transfers, top-up, loan payment services for MFI clients, and the ability to view account balances, transactions history and request cash from other users. ENDA will also trial mandatory loan repayments via M-dinar to its 150,000 clients.
In Iraq, AsiaCell announced in February 2010 that it would form a strategic partnership with a consortium of private banks, AMWAL, to provide money transfer and other services through mobile phones in Iraq.
Sources: Akhtar & Pearce, 2010; Michaels, 2010; CGAP, 2010 .
Agents
Retailers, mobile phone airtime providers, and other non-financial outlets, offer huge potential for expansion of access to finance, if they can be used as 'agents' for financial service delivery. Using banking agents and electronic payments to pay utility bills takes less time than traveling to and queuing in a range of utility offices, thereby bringing very tangible benefits. Similarly, collecting a pension, remittance receipt, and welfare or salary payment is a strong driver for opening accounts. Agents -such as retail stores or airtime sellers -are also key to the viability of mobile banking, as they are able to handle cash transactions. Opening up the market for agents could lead to a 10 fold increase in access points for financial services in Yemen, according to a recent CGAP market assessment. If small stores could become agents for financial service providers, then MTN and the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit (CAC) Bank, could expand their reach significantly. CAC is already processing bill payments and money transfers through 150 'agent' outlets made up of kiosks and store locations. (CGAP, 2010) If a common switch was also introduced, then a service by any one bank could be accessed through the entire POS and ATM network of the country.
Government Policies and Programs, Regulation and Supervision
Deficient financial infrastructure and inappropriate regulatory and supervisory frameworks have hindered financial inclusion in the MENA region, and have resulted in a financial sector that only serves a fraction of otherwise unmet financial service needs. This section explores the policy, regulatory and supervisory framework for financial inclusion in MENA, including financial infrastructure.
Regulation and Supervision
Financial Inclusion constrained by Regulatory Framework
Improved access to finance in MENA is constrained by inappropriate regulations, a lack of specialist supervisory capacity, and inadequate institutional models. The majority of MFIs in the region are registered as NGOs, and are restricted from offering deposits in addition to loans (by regulators or by their own capacity limitations). Many commercial and social investors are reluctant to finance NGOs or associations (or will only do so with short-term debt), or are not able to invest in shares. Banks face interest rate caps in several countries that make microloans unattractive, and are in many cases restricted from using agents to extend financial services. Identity ('know your customer') requirements are also relatively high in MENA, and can include requirements that are not appropriate for low income and semi-formal customers, adding a further set of costs and disincentives to banks to extend access. Technologies to improve access, such as point of sale devices and cellphone banking, are held back in MENA by restrictions on the role of agents in financial service delivery, and by extensive customer ID requirements. MENA countries have the highest requirements in terms of documents (government ID, proof of address, legal status, proof of employment, etc) needed to open a deposit account.
Microfinance legislation has been introduced, albeit on a limited scale, in two waves in the region, with the first more than a decade ago in Morocco and Tunisia, and the second more recently in countries further east, such as Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. Government reform priorities have been to ease financing constraints for enterprises, expand microsavings services, attract commercial financing into microfinance, and improve the transparency and strength of microfinance institutions. Morocco and Tunisia first introduced microcredit-specific laws in 1999 with the aim of establishing a new microcredit sector serving low income population segments. Several countries have also introduced institutional and legal reforms to extend access through post offices and state banks. Table 7 illustrates the degree to which enabling regulatory frameworks have been introduced for financial inclusion in the MENA region. Egypt has introduced regulations for non deposit-taking MFIs, while Syria and Yemen have introduced laws permitting the establishment of deposit-taking MFIs, and Jordan allowed MFIs to register as not-for-profit companies. Egypt has approved a new Non-Bank Financial Institutions Licensing and Regulatory Bill, to be supervised by the Egyptian Financial Services Authority (EFSA), which will set the regulatory framework for microfinance, leasing, and factoring institutions, as well as standards in accounting, transparency and corporate governance, and lay the foundation for a new category of non-bank microcredit companies. Allowing the creation of supervised microfinance companies can unlock potential investment, while also raising standards for transparency and corporate governance for microfinance institutions. This regulatory reform does not allow for deposit services to low income persons, although Egypt Post does provide fairly extensive access to microsavings services. In an increasing number of MENA countries a financial sector regulatory authority, such as a central bank or non-bank regulator, has supervisory responsibility for microfinance providers. However, in a number of countries there is no clear supervisory responsibility or framework, or the supervisor is a non-financial agency such as a Ministry of Social Affairs or Planning (see Annex A2.6 for detail by country). This makes the development of a sustainable, transparent and efficient microfinance sector that is able to intermediate deposits or borrowing less likely, and dependence on declining or unpredictable donor funding may continue. When compared to developing countries, MENA has a higher proportion of non-regulated institutions and a higher proportion of MFIs that fall under a non-financial regulator (table 8). Interest Rate flexibility is constrained. Interest caps are in place in at least 6 MENA countries, whether or not they are actually enforced. 13 Most MENA countries use disclosure requirements (70 percent) rather than usury ceilings in practice, to try and ensure that interest rates are transparent and understood. Currently, most MFIs charge interest rates that are much higher than the interest rate caps, in order for micro-level products to be viable, and in so doing they run a risk of being challenged in court. A more transparent approach would be to remove interest rate caps and instead strengthen consumer protection against abusive practices such as excessive fees on overdrafts, miss-selling of financial products and lack of consumer redress.
Social
Consumer Protection and Financial Inclusion
Consumer protection and financial literacy are increasing priorities worldwide, as financial inclusion increases, with almost two thirds of middle income countries assigning responsibility for these areas to the financial regulator. MENA lags other regions in terms of assigning responsibility for consumer protection or financial literacy to a financial regulator. However a majority of MENA countries introduced consumer protection reforms in 2009. Of 11 MENA countries that responded to the CGAP and World Bank Financial Access survey in 2010 survey, 7 had introduced consumer protection reforms, indicating that MENA is broadly in line with global trends in terms of increasing focus on consumer protection. Arab microfinance institutions have developed consumer protection and financial responsibility codes on a voluntary basis at a MENA regional level, and also in Jordan. MFI members of the regional microfinance network, Sanabel, signed a consumer protection and responsible finance document in 2008, committing themselves to standards of practice. Jordanian MFIs developed and signed a voluntary Code of Ethics covering disclosure and transparency, service standards, and ethical practices. 13 To date, however, there have been no known legal challenges to interest rates in this region. 
Financial infrastructure
Financial infrastructure underpins financial inclusion. Moral hazard and adverse selection are reduced as collateral frameworks and credit information systems are improved, and loans can be made -at a lower cost and risk -to clients that previously would have been excluded. Without effective secured transactions laws and judicial (or non-judicial) processes, ideally with unified collateral registries to facilitate lenders' use of collateral as a guarantee, micro entrepreneurs may not be able to leverage current assets into access to finance. Low income individuals and microenterprises also need access to low cost and safe payment mechanisms, whether for salaries, benefits, remittances, or for business transactions.
MENA has the lowest score on the Doing Business Legal Rights index of any region, however. As a result banks face higher costs of overcoming information asymmetries and higher levels of credit and default risk for micro lending, and have not yet directly entered the low income consumer or microenterprise market at any great scale. The Legal Rights index assesses the use of movable assets as collateral, the strength of creditor rights, and the availability of out of court enforcement mechanisms -all key areas for improvement for expanding financial inclusion. No MENA country scores above 4 out of 10 on this index. Banks therefore do not extend lending further into the micro and small enterprise sector. Microfinance providers are forced to rely on solidarity group lending methodologies or on collateral that is expensive to register and may not be readily enforceable, and on outdated credit assessment and risk management techniques. Low income customers and microenterprise clients face higher pricing and more paperwork and delays, and many otherwise creditworthy individuals and entrepreneurs are excluded from access to finance.
The majority of banks in the MENA region accept movable property as collateral. However, loans only secured with movable collateral are not widely used, due to the inability of banks to secure the right over the asset through a collateral registry and due to the difficulties in enforcing security interests in movable property. This is particularly acute for microloans where it may not make economic sense to execute collateral on a very small outstanding amount if the costs of doing so are relatively high. Movable property is usually accepted as a secondary type of collateral and usually taken as a complement to fixed assets (real estate property), which are also not well suited to microloans. Loans secured with assets such as receivables and inventory, are used even less often. None of the MENA countries have a modern law on secured transactions. Intangible movable property, such as accounts receivables, bank accounts and salaries, is only allowed in a few MENA countries. (de la Campa, 2010)
In most countries, MFIs have not been integrated into the formal credit information system, thus creating an information gap that could have direct consequences on the stability of the financial system. In some cases MFIs are prohibited by law from participating in the credit information system. In others, MFIs are reluctant to participate due to the high cost of the system. The high value thresholds in some credit information systems also constitute a major challenge when compared to the low value of most microloans.
The Moroccan central bank and the Palestinian Monetary
Authority have taken a regional lead in requiring microfinance institutions to also upload lending and borrower data and to verify current debts of potential clients into their credit information system. Arrangements to do so are under development in at least 5 MENA countries, but are not yet finalized, and ongoing delays threaten the quality and sustainability of microfinance sector growth, leaving an information gap that could result in similar microfinance crises. MFIs can lack awareness of the benefits of participating in national credit bureaus, and their borrower records and reporting systems may not yet meet the reporting requirements of a credit bureau.
Many Arab countries are undertaking payment system reforms, often supported by the Arab Payment Initiative (World Bank, Arab Monetary Fund, IMF). Countries are working to improve the legal framework, payment system oversight, and introduce real time gross settlement systems (RTGS), well-functioning automated clearing houses (ACH), and switching systems for connectivity between banks and card providers. The process in Egypt, as an example, is ongoing, with an RTGS and ACH established, and with full functionality being introduced in stages, for example to enable direct deposits, direct debits, mobile phone payments and extend financial inclusion.
Box 2. Egypt: Financial Infrastructure Improvements pave the way for G2P-led Financial Inclusion
Egypt is building on its improved payments systems infrastructure to move government payroll and pensions through debit cards, using the automated clearing house (ACH). As a result, 12 million monthly payments are expected to pass through the ACH within three years. Around 350,000 card-based accounts have already been opened under this new initiative, with eight banks participating. The government also plans to conduct a major portion of tax and customs collections through the ACH, and even shift government vendors' payments through the ACH, using government certified digital signatures and the treasury single account.
The government makes 30,000-40,000 procurement-related transactions daily, mostly through checks sent to microenterprises and SMEs (for example small tradespersons). These will increasingly instead be made through ATMs and banks accounts. The 'billers hub' that is currently used for bill payment to mobile phone providers, could also be extended to cover payments to government (thus making use of mobile phones), and payment of credit card bills using direct debit arrangements.
Further, a national inter-bank switch system for ATM, Electric Funds Transfer-Point of Sale and interbank mobile transactions has been established to support retail payments, and will be extended to cover the remaining four banks not yet included, and to handle local transactions in Egypt rather than abroad. Payment systems regulations would be issued to cover licensing of payment service providers and the oversight of payment services and systems.
Government Policy and Programs
Financial inclusion is not yet a priority for financial regulators in most MENA countries.
Financial regulators in MENA have the second lowest degree of involvement in promoting financial inclusion, ahead only of high income countries where financial exclusion is at much lower levels (figure 9). Almost half of all the countries covered by the CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 report (48 percent) have a strategy document for the promotion of financial inclusion, with 90 percent of those introduced within the last 6 years. Tunisian, Palestinian, Lebanese and Iranian governments, among others, have also implemented notable financial inclusion policies and programs outlined elsewhere in this paper.
State banks and post offices can have extensive branch networks for extending access to financial services. One of the largest branch networks in the region is that of the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PDBAC), the state agricultural bank in Egypt. An initial phase of reforms is showing promising results in terms of improved institutional performance and financials, with an experienced and successful banker as its manager, and nonbank activities (such as agricultural inputs supply) separated from commercial banking. The second phase, with technical assistance from Rabobank, is to better utilize its network of service outlets through improved inter-branch connectivity, product diversification, and investment in improved systems. The PBDAC example is also notable as it represents a more strategic approach of extending financial inclusion through reforms that aim to turnaround institutional performance and improve branch viability, instead of the easier short-term option of closing branches and reducing access.
The creation of a new postal bank in Morocco, building on the strengths of the Post Office as often the only institution serving the low income population -including the rural population, self-employed, and those with irregular incomes -is a promising example of the approach of creating a postal bank.
Box 3. Morocco: new Postal Bank to expand access
The Government is creating a new Postal Bank building on the existing strengths of the Post Office. The post office already provides some basic services (savings passbooks and checking accounts) to a large customer base (4.3 million people).
The new Postal Bank is expected to play a significant access role, by offering a wider range of banking services to underserved categories of the population. The Postal Bank, a subsidiary of the Post Office, will target individuals with a monthly income below 3,000 MAD (357 USD) with an objective of 5.4 million clients by 2015 (a 26 percent increase compared to 2009). These customers are not yet targeted by commercial banks. New services (transfers, payments, debit cards, overdrafts, mortgage loans) will be introduced, although lending would not be offered until a later stage when institutional capacity is more developed.
The Central Bank granted the license to the new Postal Bank in July 2009. As the new institution ventures into new territories, risk management and internal controls will need to be strengthened. In recent years, the Post Office has improved its financial operations with the assistance of consultants (IT systems, branches, back offices, audit), including improvements in internal controls required by the Central Bank during the two year licensing process. The separation of postal and financial activities should improve the quality of services, while outreach should be improved with the specialization of branches and staff, as well as the opening of new branches (550 new branches by 2018) and distribution channels (100 mobile branches and 50 cash points by 2018). The Postal Bank will be subject to the supervision of the Central Bank, like other public commercial banks.
Yemen offers an example of using technology to extend access through a post office network. The Yemen Post Office and Yemen Mobile may launch a mobile banking service, extending access through and beyond the current 300 post office locations. The Yemen Post Office provides savings to 403,000 clients and current accounts to 85,000, and has a significant volume of transfers that would underpin the viability of a mobile banking service, including domestic money transfers, government salary disbursements, retiree pensions, and social welfare fund payments. (CGAP, 2010) 4 Recommendations: a Roadmap for Financial Inclusion in MENA Financial inclusion is an increasing priority for Governments around the world. The 'roadmap' of measures outlined here would i) stimulate private sector investment in serving low income individuals and microenterprises, ii) remove policy, infrastructure and legal barriers to financial service providers to sustainably and prudently expand access to financial services, and iii) encourage product diversification and improved risk management.
The G20 has developed a set of nine Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion, through a Financial Inclusion Experts Group, which will "form the basis of a concrete and pragmatic action plan for improving access to financial services amongst the poor". These principles were endorsed by the G20 Leadership Summit in Toronto in June 2010, and an action plan will be released at the Seoul Summit in November 2010. The Principles are outlined in Annex 4. The Financial Inclusion priorities outlined in this section are fully consistent with these Principles.
Financial Inclusion Strategy backed by data, resources and commitment
Governments and regulators need to take the lead in supporting improvements in access to finance, including in access to microfinance, displaying the Leadership called for in the G20 Principles. Financial regulators and governments can add financial inclusion as a goal alongside prudential regulation and financial system stability, and develop financial inclusion strategies. The CGAP and World Bank Financial Access survey (2010) of financial regulators worldwide found that regions that include financial access in their strategies and mandate their financial regulators to carry such agendas are also the countries that reform the most. Regulators with a financial inclusion strategy are more likely to have more financial inclusion topics under their purview and more resources and staff dedicated to working on these matters. 
Agree Charters and Targets with the Private Sector
Financial inclusion can be promoted through shared public and private sector goals, developed on the basis of improved market data on financial exclusion. Cooperation with the private sector and civil society (a G20 Principle) is essential to achieve far-reaching improvements in financial inclusion. Private sector commitments, which may be backed by a threat of regulation or enforcement if the private sector is not sufficiently active in delivering them, can be an effective means of promoting financial inclusion and financial capability. Banks and MFIs can then take a leading role in promoting financial inclusion, spurred on by competition, the threat of regulation, and monitoring, and in line with market opportunities. Commitments by regulators and governments can complement private sector targets.
Charters or codes of practice can be used to agree and set out the financial sector's commitments to expanding access to financial services and to improving the terms of that access. Codes and charters can also encompass consumer education, transparency of information on products, services and tariff structures, complaint handling, and providing secure and reliable banking and payment systems; backed up by regulations and enforcement where necessary. Table 9 synthesizes the key components of what has been effective in several countries. 
Data availability
Improved data on financial inclusion and unbanked markets/customers is needed to underpin a sustainable expansion in access to finance, as emphasized by the G20 Principle for Financial Inclusion, Knowledge. Household and enterprise-level survey questions can provide governments and regulators with the data they need for designing reforms and then monitoring the effectiveness of those reform measures. Financial service providers need market data on financial service demand and needs for new market segments that they have not had previous involvement in, in order to design appropriate financial products and delivery mechanisms. In addition to financial regulator monitoring of progress on financial inclusion, government support may be needed in generating market data for financial service providers, at least initially to address this market failure.
Use Government Payments as a Stimulus for Financial Inclusion
An area that the Government has direct control over is how it pays benefits (social transfers and pension payments) and salaries. By shifting government payments to individuals (G2P, or 'Government to Person') from payments in cash disbursed from post offices or bank tellers, to bank accounts and smart cards (or even mobile phones), significant advances in financial inclusion can be made. Governments make regular payments to at least 170 million poor people worldwide. Yet in most countries, fewer than one-quarter of G2P payments to the poor land in an account that is accessible, in terms of cost and distance. (Porteous, 2006) Delivering G2P payments electronically implies creating for each recipient a store-of-value account where funds can be held for some period, and connecting that account to an electronic payment system. With these elements in place, it becomes possible to expand the account into a financially inclusive one that the recipient can use to save and to transact outgoing as well as incoming payments.
Promote Financially Inclusive Bank Accounts
MENA governments can encourage banks to launch financially inclusive accounts, shifting G2P payments (increased transaction volume) through such accounts to enhance their viability. Five MENA countries are already promoting financially inclusive bank accounts (according to central bank reporting to CGAP), and five are actively shifting Government payments (salaries, benefits) into the financial system, although only three countries are implementing both -highly interrelated -approaches in parallel. Financial inclusive accounts for low income customers offer basic services such as payments, deposits, and in some cases debit cards, in order to bring unbanked people into the banking system and build a financial history. Encouragement may also be needed by Government through shared financial inclusion targets, and even the threat of regulation if needed, for banks to offer these accounts, as they can be less profitable than full service accounts for higher income customers.
Extend access to a broader range of financial services through existing branch networks
State banks and post offices can offer a unique network of existing outlets as a delivery mechanism for financial services. Postal networks can be restricted to only offering payment and perhaps deposit services though, while access to state banks can be complicated by eligibility criteria, paperwork, inappropriate governance structures, and inefficiencies. Making use of these networks to extend low cost access to a more diverse range of financial services can involve i) institutional reform of a state bank, introducing new financial services and improving governance, portfolio quality, systems and efficiency, ii) the creation of a postal bank, often through a dedicated law, or iii) arrangements with specialized financial service providers, such as banks or MFIs, to provide financial services through the network of outlets.
Provide a Regulatory and Supervisory Framework that supports wide Financial
Inclusion based on sound risk management and with sufficient consumer protections.
Governments should consider i) allowing banks to expand access through agents, and through use of technology (including mobile phones), ii) providing a finance company model for microcredit and leasing, and iii) removing interest rate caps for microcredit, and instead strengthening consumer protection and stimulating competition between financial service providers. A regulatory and supervisory framework for deposit-taking MFIs such as microfinance banks may not be justified, as these institutions require relatively large up-front investments and can have limited branch networks. Full service commercial and state banks, as well as postal banks and post offices, are better placed to offer deposit services through existing systems and infrastructure -potentially through financial inclusive accounts -without the need for a new institutional framework such as a deposit-taking MFI.
Stronger, well performing microcredit NGOs should have the option of graduating to regulated financial institutions, such as a finance company model. A finance company legal form can provide the necessary clarity for banks and investors on key questions such as governance, ownership, tax liabilities, and capital base of MFIs, which an NGO license may not. Where regulatory frameworks have been put in place in MENA that allow specialized microfinance institutions -such as finance companies -regulated by financial regulators, the institutions set-up under those frameworks are out-performing microcredit NGOs in terms of growth, and are now a leading driver of growth in MENA microfinance. (Sanabel 2010 ) A finance company model can tap more effectively into commercial bank and microfinance investor sources of finance -both equity and debt -and potentially do so on more favorable terms (lower cost, less collateral required, longer tenors, currency), than an NGO or association model.
Branchless Banking
For branchless banking innovations to meet their potential to reduce costs and expand outreach, enabling legislation for the use of electronic payments, electronic money, and agents, is needed. Adequate payments infrastructure is also required, and ideally a common switching mechanism. The extent to which mobile banking will be transformational in a country will depend in large measure on whether there is a sufficient degree of openness (there is opportunity to start-up and experiment) and certainty (investors can be confident there will not be arbitrary or negative changes) to the legal and regulatory framework.
Box 4: Principles for an Enabling Environment for Mobile Phone Banking
First tier principles: these are necessary for mobile phone banking to happen at scale: 1. There should be sufficient certainty around electronic contracting. 2. Customers should be adequately protected against fraud and abuse in the mobile banking environment.
3. Inter-operability should be encouraged, through ensuring that providers can access payment platforms and that consumers are able to switch financial providers.
Second tier principles: for transformational models to emerge and succeed, the following additional principles are also necessary: 4. Customer due diligence procedures for account opening should be risk-based, and should not unduly prejudice remote account openings by small customers. 5. Customers should be able at least to make deposits and withdraw cash through agents and remote points outside of bank branches. 6. Adequate provision must be made for the issuance of electronic money by appropriately capitalized and supervised entities which are not necessarily banks.
In countries where mobile banking has taken off, such as Kenya, the Philippines, and Brazil, common characteristics of the interactions between regulators and service providers have been: -Willingness to consider non-traditional approaches, observe their performance and adjust rules as necessary, -Continuous dialogue between service providers and regulators, -Flexible, proportionate approaches to KYC/AML rules via transaction & balance limits, based on understanding of actual risks, and -Regulator monitoring and reporting mechanisms to keep authorities informed. (Michaels, 2010) In countries where mobile banking products have been allowed to emerge, financial regulators have tended to focus on whether consumers are making "deposits" when they hand a service provider their money, how to protect consumers, and Anti-Money Laundering rules (in particular Know Your Customer requirements). The training, performance and liability of agents (for example retailers or airtime sellers) are a particular concern to many regulators in this regard. There is also a growing regulator focus on competition, shared infrastructure and/or interoperability, and new business models involving different players.
Use of Agents
A regulatory structure is needed that allows banks to link with MFIs, telecoms providers, and other non-financial actors. Banks and other financial service providers, such as insurance companies, can provide services through agents through wholesale financing, service delivery agreements, fee-based services, agent agreements, and other arrangements. Rules on the use of non-bank retail outlets as agents are needed, that allow outlets (agents) to perform cash-in/cashout and other customer interface functions. The recent CGAP-led assessment of branchless banking options in Yemen recommended the following enabling framework for branchless banking through agents (Box 5):
Box 5. Enabling Framework recommendations for Agents, the case of Yemen 1. Any legal entity, including MFIs, post office, retail stores, MNO outlets, exchange companies, may be hired by a central bank-licensed institution as an agent to deliver limited financial services 2. Agents may provide most banking services, including bill payments, transfers, deposits, withdrawals, disbursement or repayment of loans, and national wires. 3. The financial institution should remain fully liable for services provided through agents 4. Agents and banks would need to pre-agree customer fees, and communicate those to customers 5. Agents may offer services on behalf of multiple banks, as long as the agent has a separate agreement with each bank. 6. Agents could also be required to implement 'know your customer' requirements, although potentially with lower level requirements for low volume transactions.
Source: CGAP, 2010
Strengthen Consumer Protection
Consumer protection is increasingly important as access increases, so that new customers, and existing customers with access to new services, can take well informed decisions about how best to manage and use financial services. New providers and delivery mechanisms also open up scope for consumer fraud and abuse, as well as to unintentional errors. The G20 Principles call for 'clear and transparent consumer protection regulations that require transparency in pricing and services; identify the parties ultimately responsible for upholding the protections; define supervisory authority; and ensure effective means of dispute resolution and redress are in place.'
Consumer laws and regulations are needed: i) to protect against unfair or deceptive practices, including in advertising and selling financial products, and collecting loan repayments, ii) to improve transparency through disclosure and plain language requirements for products and pricing, in a way that allows consumers to easily compare offers of financial products (for example publication of comparable loan or remittance transfer rates), and iii) to establish a low cost, efficient, and fair mechanism for resolving customer complaints and disputes. (CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010) A dedicated agency, or unit within the financial regulator, is needed to ensure a well coordinated and effective approach. Disclosure and redress are at the center of consumer protection, as a primary objective of consumer protection in financial services is to compensate for the imbalance of information, power and resources between consumers and financial institutions. (S Rutledge, pers. comm.)
Strengthen Financial Infrastructure for Financial Inclusion
Financial infrastructure improvements reduce the information asymmetry that constrains access to credit and raises the costs and risk of financial intermediation. Reforming secured transactions laws and collateral registries can make the use of collateral more feasible, particularly the kind of lower value movable collateral that is more suited to microenterprise loans. Improving credit information sharing systems, and including microfinance providers, enables microfinance providers to make use of more efficient credit scoring technologies that allow them to lower costs, risks, and loan pricing.
Regulated financial entities should be required to share credit information, ideally through national credit bureaus rather than only through narrow microfinance information-sharing systems. Sharing borrower information is key to lowering costs and overcoming information constraints. By integrating microfinance borrower information into credit bureaus, the coverage and utility of data in the credit bureaus can be improved. Financial institutions of all types can extend access to new customers, while managing risks and costs more effectively. Government intervention or encouragement may be needed to ensure that pricing by monopolistic credit bureaus is accessible for microfinance institutions. Lower pricing for loans below a certain size, may be needed to avoid passing on disproportionately high costs to borrowers. The Moroccan central bank included differential (lower) pricing for microloans as a condition of awarding the contract for management of new credit bureaus.
Ensure a level playing field for Islamic Microfinance
An innovation that is directly linked to financial inclusion is the introduction and adaptation of Islamic banking products for low income consumers and microenterprises.
A lack of Shariah-compliant financial services is a constraint on financial inclusion to a proportion of the population. The growth of Islamic microfinance will depend to a large degree on whether financial institutions can develop sufficiently attractive financial products and services, which are competitive with conventional products in terms of pricing, transparency, processing time, and burden on the client. This will be determined in part by their capacity and systems, but regulators can also provide a more level playing field for Islamic microfinance. This extends beyond financial sector regulation to the tax code, as Islamic financing that involves additional transactions such as passing on a property title, has tax implications such as capital gains tax, which are not present in conventional deals. 
Practical measures that can be taken by regulators
ANNEX 4. G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion
Innovative financial inclusion means improving access to financial services for poor people through the safe and sound spread of new approaches. The following principles aim to help create an enabling policy and regulatory environment for innovative financial inclusion. The enabling environment will critically determine the speed at which the financial services access gap will close for the more than two billion people currently excluded. These principles for innovative financial inclusion derive from the experiences and lessons learned from policymakers throughout the world, especially leaders from developing countries.
1. Leadership: Cultivate a broad-based government commitment to financial inclusion to help alleviate poverty.
2. Diversity: Implement policy approaches that promote competition and provide market-based incentives for delivery of sustainable financial access and usage of a broad range of affordable services (savings, credit, payments and transfers, insurance) as well as a diversity of service providers.
3. Innovation: Promote technological and institutional innovation as a means to expand financial system access and usage, including by addressing infrastructure weaknesses.
4. Protection: Encourage a comprehensive approach to consumer protection that recognizes the roles of government, providers and consumers.
5. Empowerment: Develop financial literacy and financial capability.
Cooperation:
Create an institutional environment with clear lines of accountability and coordination within government; and also encourage partnerships and direct consultation across government, business and other stakeholders.
7. Knowledge: Utilize improved data to make evidence based policy, measure progress, and consider an incremental "test and learn" approach acceptable to both regulator and service provider.
8. Proportionality: Build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate with the risks and benefits involved in such innovative products and services and is based on an understanding of the gaps and barriers in existing regulation.
9. Framework: Consider the following in the regulatory framework, reflecting international standards, national circumstances and support for a competitive landscape: an appropriate, flexible, risk-based Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime; conditions for the use of agents as a customer interface; a clear regulatory regime for electronically stored value; and market-based incentives to achieve the long-term goal of broad interoperability and interconnection.
These principles are a reflection of the conditions conducive to spurring innovation for financial inclusion while protecting financial stability and consumers. They are not a rigid set of requirements but are designed to help guide policymakers in the decision making process. They are flexible enough so they can be adapted to different country contexts.
ANNEX 5. Morocco: Microcredit Portfolio Repayment Crisis and Recovery
Morocco's microfinance sector grew fast, with the total loan portfolio multiplying 11 times between 2004 and 2007. It was seen as a regional leader. However, in 2007 some signs of stress -notably clients' over-indebtedness and loan delinquency -started to emerge. A study conducted by Planet Finance
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The roots of the credit crisis can be found in the institutional capacity of microcredit associations. The unprecedented growth overstretched their capacity, translating into lenient credit policies, obsolete Management Information Systems (MIS) systems, lack of internal controls and substandard governance. Multiple lending to the same clients was an aggravating factor. A study conducted by the central bank estimated that 40% of microcredit beneficiaries had more than one loan. The problem is particularly acute in urban areas. Microcredit associations have put in place recovery plans that include management changes and freezing new disbursements. Associations are tightening their credit processes, putting in place teams focusing on loan recovery, and are taking judicial action with a demonstration effect on delinquent borrowers. They are also exchanging credit information on a weekly basis to control over-indebtedness. Smaller microcredit associations are planning to share resources such as back office systems or to merge. These efforts are slowly paying off. However, some associations have been severely hit and will have to be restructured; others are emerging stronger and well positioned for another phase of growth.
The Ministry of Finance organized the merger acquisition of the worst affected association, Zakoura, by the Fondation des Banques Populaires, a large microcredit association backed by the Banque Centrale Populaire, to restore confidence and avoid further contagion effects on loan delinquency.
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A credit bureau was launched in October 2009, with borrower information from the leading microcredit associations included. This was a major step forward that allows microcredit associations and banks to improve credit analysis as well as to control client over-indebtedness.
A directive was prepared to strengthen the governance of the associations and introduce tighter financial reporting requirements. The Moroccan government also secured 46 million USD in donor funding to support the sector, provide new liquidity, and strengthen management information systems and internal control.
The Ministry of Finance has launched a survey with funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the sector and to provide recommendations to improve the regulatory framework for microfinance. The study will also look at the transformation of some of the largest institutions into commercial, prudentially regulated, entities.
Sources: Reille, 2010; MIX, Sanabel, CGAP, 2010; Microfinance Information Exchange. 
